CAROUSEL VAT FRAUD SCHEMES

OFFSHORE ALERT CONFERENCE LONDON 11 NOVEMBER 2019



AGENDA

- 1 Impact of Carousel VAT Fraud in the EU
- **2** The Mechanics of Carousel VAT Fraud Schemes
- 3 Regulatory and Enforcement Options
- 4 Enforcement Operation Greed
- 5 The Role of Investigative and Intelligence Consultancies



IMPACT OF CAROUSEL VAT FRAUD IN THE EU

2% of Organized Crime Groups = 80% of the fraud



Losses amount to c. 1.5% of EU-27 GDP.




Growing in Romania, Finland, UK, Ireland, Estonia, and France between 2016 and 2018



Equivalent to annual GDP of countries such as Belarus, Slovenia, Lithuania and Serbia



Moving from goods to include intangible products (e.g. carbon credits)






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
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Confidential and Proprietary









€15 million - €3.75 million VAT

The buying business sells the goods to another business, charging VAT. It pays the VAT received to the authorities. The same happens with subsequent sales, a.k.a. the "buffers".

Buffer A sold to Buffer B; who sold to Buffer C, who sold to Buffer D for €18 million + €4.5 million VAT



€15 million - €3.75 million VAT €10 million - 0 VAT The last business exports the goods without charging VAT and claims the VAT it paid to the Buffer D paid €4.5 million VAT last buffer company. Eg. Buffer D exports the poultry



for €20 million 0 VAT. Claims a refund of the €4.5 million VAT.


VAT Loss = €3.75 million

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REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS






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OPERATION GREED – THE NUMBERS





Firms performed undeclared services (cleaning, transport) for a third-party company.

Some of the money is withdrawn in cash, with the remainder transferred abroad to further complicate the work of law enforcement.



The third-party sent invoices to service providers. Payments were immediately sent by the third-party to an exchange agency. The third-party declared bankruptcy shortly after to disguise the scheme.

The firms that conducted undeclared work claimed back VAT from the authorities. The third-party company did not declare VAT to the tax authorities before going bankrupt.



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OPERATION GREED - THREE PILLARS TO THE FRAUD



VAT Carousel Fraud





Cross-Border Tax Evasion





Terrorist Financing

- Traditional carousel VAT fraud scheme in Denmark involving multiple individuals and c. € 66 million in laundered funds.
- In November 2019, three Danish ministers proposed the creation of a new unit to fight VAT fraud and terrorist financing.

- Far reaching investigation, including: New Zealand, Lithuania, Spain and Germany.
- Most of the fraud focused on services rather than products.

 Links to Spanish terrorist cells identified



OPERATION GREED – WHAT NOW?

1000+ companies and 5,000+ invoices reviewed. Estimates put the fraud at c. DKK 500m (€67m)

2017 to 2018

Seven Danish banks involved in the fraud scheme.

March 2019

Sentencing expected

Fall 2020









Confidential and Proprietary





October 2017

Danish police raids 39 addresses, arresting 18 people. DKK 70m (c. €9,3m) are seized. Five suspects remain in custody.

December 2018

Potential links to terrorist financing identified. Several suspects belong to Spain-based fundamentalist cell.

May 2019

DKK 169m (c. €22m) from VAT carousel fraud and money laundering funneled through corporate accounts at major Danish banks.



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VAT Carousel

Detecting and Investigating Organised Crime


Imam Hoque

Co-Founder / COO

Nov 2019




Example modus operandi that requires discovery






However, the data represents a complex picture



Millions of companies and individuals



The challenge is finding the needles in the haystack





A new paradigm is required that uses a "Context" driven approach

Event Based Statistics

Traditionally, analytical decision engines have focused on using statistics to score events (e.g. applications and transactions).

Single View Analytics

More recently people are scoring entities (people, organisations, vehicles and addresses), however a key challenge is providing the single view or "entity resolution" across internal and external data sources.


Network Analytics

People are starting to realise that the real world is a series of networks and a decision must account for the network (businesses, families, trading groups, spheres of influence and organised crime gangs).


Realtime / Dynamic / Adjustable

Not only this, in today's world the complex task of consolidating entities or scoring networks have to occur in real time as well as batch, with the ability to adjust matching and network building criteria.

Example within the compliance:



Using a context based approach







Using proactive approach

Early Fraud detection minimizes the losses and maximize the success of criminal investigations

Reactive Approach



Proactive Approach




OUTCOME

Provide a list of suspected fraud (95% True Positives) before it is committed


From a 3 weeks pre-investigation to a 5 minutes pre-investigation

Automatically generated alerts by company owner






Explainable scores generated by a context driven model






Networks automatically identified and displayed for review






Organised crime has a consistent picture: HSBC Financial Crime FIU





Approach to adopting automated model based detection





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